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This thesis seeks to provide an historical understanding of
Russian and Soviet naval developments. This historical basis is
provided to complement technological analysis of Soviet naval
concepts and systems. The origins of Soviet naval traditions are
examined, beginning with the establishment of the ancient Russian
state of Kiev, the birth of the Tsarist Navy (under Peter I) , the
origins of the Communist State and Navy, and concluding with the
Soviet naval developments during the Second World War. In
examining these developments significant naval victories (Sweden,
1721; and Tchesme, 1770) and defeats (Crimean, 1853; and Tsu-
shima, 1905) are noted, along with non-combat administrative
reforms. The employment of the Russian Navy in World War One and
the Soviet Navy in World War Two are also examined. The conclu-
sion is drawn that the primary mission of the Soviet Navy is to
support the Soviet Army in a continental theater. This
conclusion is based on the historical failure of the Russian and
Soviet Navies in conducting blue-water operations (inferring a
notion of perceived futility in attempting these operations) , the
historical success in conducting coastal operations in support of
the army (inferring the utility of these types of operations)
,
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I. INTRODUCTION
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need
not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you
know yourself but do not know the enemy, for every
victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If
you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will
succumb in every battle.
- Sun Tzu [Ref. 1: p. 18]
To "know" the Soviet Union and its Navy, many Western
sources tend to emphasize technological aspects, focusing
almost entirely on weapons and systems. This type of
analytical approach to understanding one's enemy, taking a
system or component and removing it from its overall context,
often completely ignores other less obvious contributions to
the whole. In studying the tree the contribution of the
forest is overlooked. The historical context of the system
is one such neglected contribution.
In the Chief of Naval Operations' publication Understand-
ing Soviet Naval Developments . 5th ed. , only seven of over
150 total pages are devoted to the historical development of
the Soviet Navy [Ref. 2]. This bias is not restricted to
U.S. Government publications, in Norman Polmar's Guide to
the Soviet Naw . 4th ed. , only one of over 500 pages is
devoted to history [Ref. 3]. In both these publications
those pages not discussing historical developments are
concerned with hardware aspects of the Soviet Navy.
The Soviet view as to the importance of historical
knowledge to the understanding of navies and armed forces
would appear to be markedly different from that demonstrated
by these Western works. This view is articulated by Fleet
Admiral Sergei Gorshkov in The Seapower of the State .
To understand better the possibilities of the present-day
fleet and to gain an idea of its lines of development in
the future, it is very useful to look at the processes of
its development in the past and the role played by navies
in the system of the armed forces of the states in
strengthening their independent position.
[Ref. 4: p. 60]
This Western bias towards technological aspects of the
Soviet Navy when married to the Western perception of naval
importance, leads to a possible misinterpretation of the
potential employment of Soviet naval force. Focusing on
technology alone, mirror imaging applications of these
technologies, and drawing conclusions as to employment is not
limited to weapons systems. Low context (or often out of
context) technologically biased analysis of Soviet Naval
Force Control systems and the communications technology
supporting these systems, is also common.
Crucial to understanding a military opponent is an
analysis and understanding of the opponent's Command and
Control. This analysis should not be conducted in a low
context vacuum but rather with an understanding of how the
historical framework in the system evolved. Rear Admiral
Alfred T. Mahan's comments on the timeless importance of the
study of history:
A study of the military history of the past... is enjoined
by great military leaders as essential to correct ideas and
to the skillful conduct of war in the future. .. .While many
of the conditions of war may vary from age to age with the
progress of weapons, there are certain teachings in the
school of history which remain constant.... [Ref. 5: p. 4]
This thesis will seek to lay the basis for an analysis of
Soviet naval operations and systems (including the structure
of control systems) , by developing an historical
understanding of Russian and Soviet naval developments. In
writing this thesis, the author does not propose the study of
history at the exclusion of all other forms of analysis, but
instead offers an historical framework of the Soviet Navy.
The intent of this framework is to complement technological
analysis of Soviet force control systems, not replace it.
The scope of research will be to consolidate available
knowledge of the historical development and employment of the
Russian and Soviet Navies. This information can serve as a
prelude for further comprehensive study of Soviet naval
concepts and systems, especially force control and force
control systems. Although not covered in the scope of this
thesis, a particularly useful application of the concept of
historical study would be an in depth analysis of the Soviet
naval force control system and control structure of the
Second World War.
The mere existence of Soviet naval traditions is, in
itself, a debatable issue. An equally difficult subject is
that given such naval traditions, when did they begin? What
exactly are the roots of the Soviet Navy?
In answering these questions there appear to be two
schools of thought. The first, more widely ascribed to by
Western historians and naval writers, is that Soviet naval
traditions are at best weak and discontinuous, and what
traditions there are began with the reign of Tsar Peter I
(the Great) , in the eighteenth century. Vice Admiral
Friedrich Ruge, Federal German Navy (Ret.) comments that many
Soviet references to a maritime history prior to Peter I are
without proof and represent a convenient rewrite of history
on which to base imperialistic claims. He further classifies
these historical references as "fairy tales" [Ref. 6: pp. 2-
3], While Admiral Ruge's comments may appear emotional, when
considering the West German view of the Soviets, the comments
still reveal a skeptical view of the Soviet claims. One
official U.S. Navy publication on Soviet naval developments
addresses the matter bluntly: "The Soviet Navy traces its
beginnings from the early 1700s when the Western-oriented
Tsar Peter I founded Petrograd (now Leningrad) . . . and built a
navy to fight the Swedes." [Ref. 2: p. 5]
The argument to these Western views is that Soviet and
Russian naval traditions not only exist but that they are
also strong and longstanding. Admiral Gorshkov traces the
development of these seafaring traditions as far back as the
third century.
History shows that already at that time (the third
century) the old slav tribes undertook ambitious sea
voyages ... in 269 A.D. these tribes brought a large fleet
and crushed Athens, Corinth and Sparta and reached Crete
and Cyprus, (this) makes it perfectly obvious that, for the
old slavs . .
. sea navigation and knowledge of sea routes on
the Black, Marmora, Aegean, and Mediterranean Seas were
already far from new. [Ref. 4: pp. 66-67]
That the disagreement on the origins and existence of
Soviet naval traditions is between the Soviet and Western
camps is no surprise in view of the United States' own valid
claims to a rich seafaring past and the resurgence of the
Soviet Navy during the latter part of this century. But
whether there are Soviet naval traditions, and whether in
fact they began before, with, or after Peter I, is not really
the issue. What is important, is that in the minds of Soviet
naval personnel and Soviet peoples, these events are real. A
naval tradition, after all, is not a genetic trait but rather
a perceived trait. The Soviet view of the importance of
history (previously espoused by Admiral Gorshkov) is further
supported by Marxist-Leninist and military doctrine.
Marxist-Leninism teaches that without a deep knowledge of
history it is impossible to correctly understand the
present and predict the future. [Ref. 7: p. 3]
If the Soviets believe they have rich naval traditions, then
regardless of historical fact, they do have a rich naval
traditions. In the overall context of the Soviet Navy this
belief, a source of great pride to navy men, should be
realized.
II. NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO PETER I
Gorshkov places the genesis of Russian naval art in the
seventh century A.D., when "our forefathers engaged in armed
combat on the Black Sea." [Ref. 8: p. 13] While these events
may have occurred, along with those of the third century, and
Slavic peoples may have participated, the role they played in
these events is suspect. The area of Eastern Europe which
would later become Russia and from which these expeditions
were launched was inhabited by Slavic people, the forefathers
of the Great Russians. However, this area was ruled in
succession by the Goths (200-370) , the Huns (370-558) , the
Avars (588-650) and the Khazars (650-737).* All of these
groups forced the Slavic tribes to participate in both naval
and military excursions, some of which were similar to those
described by Admiral Gorshkov. It would appear, however,
that any naval experience gained by the Slavs during these
periods was as a result of conscription rather than out of
any love of the sea, and futhermore did not include any
"command time." [Ref. 9: pp. 33-34]
Lack of willing participation in itself does not diminish
the historical relevance of these naval maneuvers. Rather
the fact is that at the time they occurred, the Slavs lacked
* The Avar horde was composed of Turkic and Mongolian
tribes while the Khazars were a Turkic tribe.
any sort of unity which could be construed as a government.
Clearly for any such events to have any bearing on "national"
traditions, a nation, or at least something vaguely similar
should exist. Prior to the ninth century, the Slavs discus-
sed herein were disorganized factions of many different
tribes, most of which were constantly at war with each other.
[Ref. 10: pp. 1:39-34]
During the latter part of the ninth century some unity
and order came to the region, and with it the birth of
sovereign Russia itself. It was with this birth of a nation,
however primitive, that seafaring traditions could themselves
begin.
By the beginning of the eighth century the woodlands and
steppes of Eastern Asia were widely populated by Slavic
tribes. The most numerous of these clans had taken the
tribal name Rukhs from one of their many conquerors.* This
name was later corrupted to Rus and later to Russian. It was
these Rus that were subjugated by the Goths, the Huns, and
the Avars among others. [Ref. 11: pp. 21-22]
The Rus were apparently poor political organizers, for
the best they could establish in the way of a nation was a
loose confederation of city states. This confederation was
less than ideal for "national" defense (witness the almost
* During the years 200 B.C. to 200 A.D., the steppe was
controlled by Sarmatians, the chief tribe of which was the
Alans. Some of the clans of this tribe were called the
Rukhs.
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constant rule by other tribes) and in the middle eighth
century the Rus were again dominated, this time by
Scandinavians. These Norsemen, or Varangians as they were
known by the Rus, had been dominant in the North Sea and
Baltic for centuries. As European populations expanded, the
Varangians moved from the Baltic region down the wide, slow
moving rivers of the steppe, to the Sea of Azov and the Black
Sea. Here, in the vicinity of the Crimea, the Varangians
established the state of Great Sweden. Taking the name of
their vassals for themselves, the Varangians began calling
themselves Russians and Great Sweden the Russian Kaganate.
The Kaganate flourished, trading not only with the Baltic
states but also with the Eastern Roman Empire at Byzantium.
This free flowing trade was almost entirely river based and
depended on the control of the steppe. [Ref. 11: pp. 29-30]
In 850 the Khazars returned to the steppe, oppressing the
Slavic city-states of the Dnieper river valley, and isolating
Great Sweden from its Baltic trading partners. For the
Slavic cities, the solution to this problem was to invite a
force of Varangians, who also had reason to oppose the Khazar
rule, into their cities, restoring order to the region. This
call was answered by a Danish adventurer, Rurik of Jutland, a
legendary chieftain with a wide reputation as a pirate.
[Ref. 11: p. 31]
Rurik established himself in the city of Novgorod in the
Dnieper valley, and dispatched two of his lieutenants South,
to liberate the city of Kiev. These assistants, Askold and
Dir, did just that but were not content to stop at Kiev.
They joined forces with the Russians of Great Sweden and
proceeded to mount a seaborne attack on Byzantium from across
the Black Sea. This force made several stops en route to
loot and plunder. This delay along with poor weather,
allowed the Greeks effectively to thwart the attack. [Ref.
10: p. 1:70] While the assault itself was a failure it none
the less can represent the birth of Russian naval operations.
Having reestablished the trade routes to the near East,
Rurik returned to Denmark leaving Askold and Dir in control
of Kiev. Although he never returned to Novgorod, he was
willingly replaced as ruler by Oleg (a Norwegian) [Ref. 9:
pp. 50-51], Rurik had secured a place for himself in Russian
naval history. As late as 1904 on the eve of the Russo-
Japanese war, the Imperial Russian Navy had in commission a
cruiser bearing his name.* [Ref. 12: p. 207]
After a short period of time to establish himself in
Novgorod, Oleg chose to relocate his fiefdom further South in
Kiev. In doing so he also took the opportunity to kill the
current rulers, Askold and Dir. [Ref. 10: p. 59] By
selecting Kiev as his power base, Oleg established the Kievan
State, a dynasty which would last until the Mongol invasion
of the thirteenth century. Kievan Russia was a federation of
* Rurik' s subordinate Askold was similarly honored.
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principalities which reached a height in 1054, and then began
a gradual decline culminating in the Mongol invasion of 1240.
[Ref. 11: pp. 41-44]
However fragile, it was during the Kievan period that
Byzantine Christianity and the society that would carry
Russia into the twentieth century were established. This
period also saw a transition from a trade based economy to
one based on agriculture. [Ref. 11: pp. 44-45] None the
less, the Kievan State attempted five naval raids on
Byzantium, the first led by Oleg in 907, and later raids in
941, 944, 971, and 1043 [Ref. 10: p. 1:81]. Due to a lack of
continued strong leadership and the rise of the agricultural
economy (vice trade) , this fledgling maritime tradition fell
into something of a decline along with the strength of the
society in general [Ref. 9: pp. 67-80].
Despite the recession experienced by the Kievan state
during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Russian
maritime developments to that date had shown promise of
continued progress. Although most of the exploits had been
restricted to river operations (an exception being the Black
Sea portions of those expeditions against the Byzantine
Empire) it cannot be said what continued naval development
would have spawned had it been allowed to occur. A possible
progression would have been to expand maritime trade from the
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Figure 2.1 Kievan Russia
[Ref. 13: p. 35]
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principalities. An expansion of oceanic commerce, would most
likely necessitate the development of a blue-water navy to
protect this commerce. Such idle speculation is pointless as
this evolution of Russian seapower was not to take place.
The reason for this retardation in development was the Mongol
invasion of Eastern Europe and the resulting devastation.
The damage inflicted by the Mongols on all aspects of the
fledgling Russian civilization was unparalleled in its scope.
Having conquered most of Central Asia by 1215, the Mongols
prepared to assault Eastern and Central Europe, along with
China and the remaining portions of Asia. The attack on
Eastern Europe was overwhelming, in short order in excess of
100,000 cavalry troops had overrun the Russians, Poles, and
Bohemians killing the populace and destroying the cities of
any who refused to succumb to Mongol rule. Kiev resisted and
was annihilated. As much as six years after the onslaught
Kiev was reported to have only two hundred houses left
standing and the surrounding countryside littered with human
bones. The city of Novgorod was spared partly because of its
location in woodlands which were of little interest to the
Mongols, but also because any assault would have taken place
during the summer and the surrounding terrain (swampland) was
less than ideal for the cavalry of the raiders. [Ref. 9: p.
82] While Novgorod had avoided the Mongolian holocaust, it
did not escape military confrontation entirely. In 1240, as
a result of a holy crusade against Orthodox Christianity, the
13
principality was invaded by Teutonic Knights. This invasion
was successfully repelled but left Novgorod in a weakened
condition. Realizing that to resist the Mongols in such a
weakened condition would be useless, ruling Prince Alexander
Nevsky succumbed to the inevitability of Mongolian rule.
[Ref. 9: p. 85]
In late 1241 the Great Khan of the Mongolian Empire died.
As a result of his passing the invading armies returned Asia
to allow their leaders to participate in the selection of a
new Great Khan. In the wake of this withdrawal all of Asia
and Eastern Europe had been conquered, the confederation of
Russian city-states had been shattered and Kievan society was
finished. [Ref. 14: p. 30]
As destructive as the Mongol invasion had been, the
ensuing two and a half centuries of their rule, while not
entirely destructive to the society, were to have several
long term effects on Russia and her naval development. From
the Mongols, the Russians learned the system of autocratic
rule. The Russia that would emerge from the Mongol sphere of
influence in the late fifteenth century would do so as an
absolute monarchy. Gone would be the city-state alliance of
principalities. While Russia endured centuries of Mongol
rule, Western Europe would undergo a renaissance of science,
art and technology. Dominated by an Asian power and isolated
from the West, Russia would not benefit from this revival.
When Russia broke the yoke of Mongol oppression she would
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remain centuries behind the societies of the West. Lastly,
and important to naval development, the invading forces which
caused such destruction had attacked by way of land. The
finest navy of the age could have done little to save the
fragile state, and without a strong army to oppose the
Mongols the Russians had quickly capitulated. This relative
importance of land armies over ocean going navies remained a
tenet of Soviet military thought. [Ref. 15. pp. 171-172]
Throughout the period of Mongol rule, a bitter rivalry
over which city would be the political center of subjugated
Russia raged between the cities of Novgorod and Moscow.
Under the leadership of Ivan III (the Great) * Moscow slowly
stripped Novgorod of territory and influence, absorbing the
city into the expanding Muscovite state. In 1474 the Great
Khan of the Mongolian Empire, concerned with the show of
independence shown by Moscow, directed Ivan to make a
personal appearance in tribute. Ivan defiantly refused and
the Khan attempted to enforce his edict with military force.
The Mongol armies were turned away and the Mongol domination
of Russia was over. [Ref. 14: pp. 40-50] Having escaped from
Mongol rule, Russia found herself isolated from the Baltic
Sea by Sweden and Denmark, and from the Black Sea by the
Turks and the Crimean Tatars. Covetous of access to salt
* With the fall of the Roman Empire in 476 and
Constantinople in 1453, Ivan saw the Principality of Moscow
as the third Rome and the protector of Christendom. As the
Prince of Moscow Ivan assumed the title of Caesar or Tsar.
15
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water ports, succeeding Tsars and Tsarinas would relentlessly
attempt to gain access to open, ice-free seas.
[Ref. 9: p. 186]
The most naval minded of these Tsars prior to Peter I was
Ivan IV (the Terrible), grandson of Ivan III. Although his
attempts to gain access to the Black and Baltic Seas were
unsuccessful, Ivan IV did initiate Russia's Eastward
expansion towards the Pacific Ocean [Ref. 11: pp. 105-106]
along with several other contributions to the conception of
the Russian Navy. It was during Ivan IV 's rule that trade
relations with England began and the port city of Arkhangelsk
on the White Sea was opened to European merchants. Ivan IV
also commissioned Western instructors in the arts of naval
warfare and maritime sciences, and attempted to obtain
English shipwrights and naval engineers. These latter
requests were diplomatically refused by Queen Elizabeth
although she did send Ivan a small sailing vessel as a gift.
[Ref. 12: pp. 8-9]
With the death of Ivan IV began the "times of trouble"
(1598-1613) , a particularly difficult period in Russian
history marked by weak and confused leadership, internal and
external strife, and a struggle to find a national identity.
Throughout the times of trouble, Russia relentlessly
continued her Eastward expansion. This disquieting period
ended with the accession of the Romanov dynasty to the throne
17
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of Russia. This family would rule Russia until overthrown by
the communist revolution in the twentieth century.
[Ref. 13: pp. 157-158]
Naval developments during the first two regimes of the
Romanov dynasty were small in scale. During the reign of
Michael (1613-1645) Cossack pirates operated on the Black Sea
and its river approaches, raiding both the Turks and the
Crimean Tatars. Hardly loyal subjects, the pirates were not
above raiding Moscow. [Ref. 11: pp. 124-125] Alexis (1645-
167 6) did secure a naval victory against the Swedes,
capturing the island of Kotlin in the Gulf of Finland. This
victory was short lived as the Swedes, in concert with the
Poles, repulsed the Russians. During the reign of Alexis,
Russia did make two attempts to start a shipbuilding
industry. Both attempts were failures over the long term
although the second effort produced the Orel 22 . a three
masted ship of some 80 feet in length, and a number of
gunboats. [Ref. 12: pp. 14-15] It is not for the program of
naval construction or the victory over the Swedes that Alexis
is noteworthy. Rather it is for the contributions of his
son, Peter I, the father of the Russian Navy.
19
III. THE TSARIST NAVY
While there may be dispute as to the traditional
relevance of those naval events previously mentioned, there
is no argument as to the profound, perhaps revolutionary,
influence that Peter the Great had on the development of the
Russian Navy. On this point Western and Soviet writers agree
[Ref. 8: pp. 11-16, Ref. 2: p. 5]. It was during the reign
of Peter I that a formal naval school was established,
operational and organizational procedures were written, and a
professional naval officer corps formed. Peter's rule also
saw decisive naval victories over Sweden, a regional naval
power of the era, and the attainment of coveted access to the
Baltic. [Ref. 11: pp. 148-158]
At the time of Peter's birth in 1672, Russia was a
backward, almost culturally bankrupt society dominated by the
Orthodox church. Having been bypassed by the European
renaissance, almost all Russian education was controlled by
the clergy, and emphasized the humanities. There was almost
no study of science and technology. [Ref. 13: pp. 206-207]
There was in Moscow a sizable Western suburb of European
immigrants, mostly merchants and military advisors. Alexis
(Peter's father) frequently visited this suburb and Peter's
mother had been a ward of a Russian nobleman who lived there.
This parental interest in the West, and ready association
20
with the immigrants, was a trait shared by Peter. After he
ascended to the throne, Peter sought to expand his knowledge
of the West first-hand. [Ref. 16: pp. 19-23,150]
Thus was born the Great Embassy, a group of 200 well bred
Russians, who from 1697-1698 toured Europe, visiting Sweden,
Holland, England, Germany and Austria. Peter was the first
Tsar to visit the countries of Western Europe. During his
journey he studied shipbuilding, navigation and other aspects
of these country's military establishments. After his return
to Russia, Peter established a naval school to train
officers, prepared a table of naval ranks and maritime
regulations, and began a naval construction program using
imported technical experts. At the time of his death in
1725, there were some 800 Russian ships and nearly 30,000
sailors plying the Baltic. [Ref. 9: pp. 254-271]
Peter's attempts to expand Russia toward the sea were
partly successful.* A twenty-one year struggle with Sweden
ended in 1721 with the Russians firmly established on the
Baltic and several decisive naval victories to their credit.
As to any Southern expansion, prior to the conflict with
Sweden Peter had established a naval base on the Sea of Azov
and was preparing to press on toward the Black Sea. Loss of
* Peter's expansion and naval exploration would continue
after his death. Only a year prior to the end of his reign,
Peter dispatched captain Vitus Bering on a voyage of
discovery to determine whether North America and Asia were
joined together. In 1728 Captain Bering discovered the
strait which bears his name today. [Ref. 9: p. 277, Ref. 12:
pp. 43-44]
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support from Poland and Denmark in the Northern War, along
with increased pressure from the Turks, forced Russia to
surrender its Southern gains in 1711. Access to the Black
Sea would not be realized until 1787. [Ref. 13: pp. 221-226]
During the years following Peter's death, the material
condition and training of the Russian Navy declined
significantly. The reasons for this decline are two. First,
the institution and buildup of the Tsarist Navy was
predominantly the result of Peter's insatiable desire for a
navy and his strong personal interest in achieving these
aims. Without the personal intercession of Peter, the
Russian Navy would not have shown the development that it
did. Many of the foreign naval leaders and experts, so
instrumental in translating Peter's wishes into tangible
results were personally loyal to Peter. When he died this
loyalty was not transferred to his heirs. Secondly, the
years after Peter's death were marked by an unstable
procession of Tsars and Tsarinas, six different monarchs in
thirty-seven years, all but two of which served for three
years or less. This discontinuity of leadership and absence
of royal interest, resulted in the Imperial Navy's decline.
[Ref. 9: pp. 279-280, Ref. 12: pp. 42-43]
The Tsarist Navy began a resurgence under Catherine II
(the Great) . A Romanov by marriage only, Catherine ascended
to the throne when her husband Peter III (grandson of Peter
I) was overthrown. Catherine reorganized the Naval Academy
22
Figure 3.1 Russia at Peter's Death
[Ref. 14: p. 79]
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and the Admiralty, restarted the naval construction program
and hired fresh foreign officers* to lead her rebuilt fleets.
[Ref. 17: pp. 27-28]
Having rebuilt the Baltic Fleet, Catherine set about
obtaining access to the Black Sea and in September of 1768
Russia declared war on the Turkish Empire. One year later
the Tsarina dispatched two squadrons from the Baltic Fleet
with orders to circumnavigate Europe, enter the Mediterranean
Sea and attack the Turkish Navy. The reason for this bold
exercise in seapower was the hope of distracting the Turks
from the Black Sea. The voyage was long and arduous and
could not have been accomplished with out the assistance of
the English. Nonetheless, the maneuver was ambitious and
daring for so inexperienced a fleet. [Ref. 14: p. 166]
The gamble paid off as the Russian squadrons sailed into
the Aegean Sea and crushed the Turkish fleet at the Battle of
Tchesme (July, 1770) . The pressure relieved, Catherine sent
her tiny Southern fleet out of the Sea of Azov and into the
Black Sea, where the Turks were again defeated [Ref. 17: p.
28]. During the remaining fifteen years of her reign there
would be another confrontation with the Turks (1787) , with
results similar to the first, and a continuing struggle with
the Swedes which resulted in a successful naval war from
* One of the notable foreign officers recruited by
Catherine was the American naval hero John Paul Jones. This
appointment, coming as it did so soon after the American
revolution, caused a good deal of distress among the British
naval officers serving in the Russian Navy.
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1788-1790. By the time of her death in 1796, Catherine's
Russia would be firmly established on the Baltic and Black
Seas, maintaining strong fleets in each.
[Ref. 17: pp. 28-33]
Geopolitical activity in Europe following Catherine's
death was in a chaotic state of multi-national war, as
Napoleon attempted to conquer the continent. Primarily a
conflict between a great land power (France) and a great sea
power (England) , other nations were drawn into the fray as
alliances were made and broken, and both peace and war were
declared frequently. Tsarist Russia was not exempt from this
chaos. During the first fifteen years of the eighteenth
century Russia was: allied with France twice, at war with
France three times; allied with England three times, at war
with England twice; allied and at war with Turkey once; and
allied with Austria, Denmark, Naples, and Sweden though not
continuously or necessarily simultaneously.
[Ref. 14: pp. 183-209]
The Tsarist Navy took part in naval engagements
associated with many of the conflicts of the Napoleonic era,
fighting some of the strongest and weakest navies of the age.
Although the Russian Navy did engage the navies of France and
England during these years, she never did so alone, always
having the assistance of an ally. Throughout the Napoleonic
era the Russian Navy gave good account of itself, produced
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several native Admirals, and emerged from the wars in 1815
second only to the British Navy in strength.*
[Ref . 12: p. 135]
Following the Napoleonic era, the Russian Navy suffered a
period of neglect and by 1825 almost all Russian naval power
was concentrated in the Baltic. Naval developments under
Nicholas I, who came to power in 1825, were inconsistent. No
strong supporter of the Navy and very land oriented, Nicholas
drafted the best naval personnel for service in the army. By
1840 the Russian Navy had slipped to third place, behind the
French. The Russian Navy did combine forces with the English
and French and defeated a Egyptian-Turkish fleet at the
Battle of Navarino in 1827. this action ignited yet another
Russo-Turkish conflict, lasting from 1828-1829. [Ref. 12:
pp. 135-138, 146-153]
Up to this point in history the Tsarist Navy had fared
reasonably well in conflicts with the other navies of the
day. There had been both victories and defeats, and despite a
succession of land oriented rulers, the Russian Navy, while
not the best navy of the age, remained a capable force. The
Crimean War was to mark a change in the good fortune of the
Russian fleets, and would began a long period of domination
* The Napoleonic wars had left the French Navy almost
completely destroyed. The Spanish had ceased to be a power
for some time and the Turks and Swedes, never really major
naval powers at the start of the war, had suffered an overall
decline. These developments left the Russians in a fortunate
second place. This second position, however, was a distant
one in all aspects.
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of the Russian Navy by some of the world's most powerful
navies.
The Crimean War was triggered by Nicholas I's resumption
of the ancient Russian attempts to gain free access to the
Mediterranean Sea. In 1853 Russian Armies occupied the
Balkans, a Turkish principality, and threatened the Straits
of the Bosporus. Turkey immediately declared war and
demanded the Russians withdraw. The Tsar refused and in
November 1853 destroyed a much weaker Turkish Fleet at the
Battle of Sinope. Impending Russian domination of the region
prompted England and France, displaying uncharacteristic
cooperation, to enter the war on the side of the Turks. The
Anglo-French alliance blockaded the Baltic, harassed the
Russian fleet in the Pacific, and sailed a naval force into
the Black Sea laying seige to the Russian stronghold of
Sevastopol. The weaker Russian fleet remained in port,
moving naval cannon and personnel ashore for defense of the
city and scuttling ships to block the harbor. After a year
of isolation the Russians surrendered, abandoned the Balkans
and peace was declared. The Treaty of Paris of 1856 included
prohibition of Russian naval units and coastal fortifications
on the Black Sea. A military and naval catastrophe, the
Russian nation had faced front line European powers and lost,
suffering a substantial loss of political and military
strength in the process. [Ref. 13: pp. 336-340]
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After the Crimean disaster, the Russian Navy began the
final stages of transition from a wooden navy, powered by
sail, to one of iron, powered by steam. An agrarian economy
and corresponding lack of industrial base made this a
particularly difficult transition for Tsarist Russia.
Although technological advances were slow, a number of
administrative reforms were completed. These reforms were
directed by Minister of Marine Grand Duke Konstaitian, also
the brother of Tsar Alexander II. The Grand Duke reorganized
the fleets more along Western lines and made provisions for a
reserve [Ref. 12: pp. 173-182]. A gradual buildup of Pacific
capabilities at Vladivostok was begun and the Baltic Fleet
made out of area cruises including a visit to New York City
during the American Civil War. The Black Sea remained free
of Russian naval presence until the Treaty of Paris was
denounced in 1871. Another attempt at the Bosporus was made
in 1877 and again British intervention prevented a Russian
success, although the Black Sea Fleet survived the conflict.
Eastern expansion continued to conflict with that of Japan, a
rapidly rising Pacific power. This conflict would ultimately
be resolved by the Russo-Japanese War.
[Ref. 12: pp. 183-203]
The Russians found the accommodations for the Pacific
Fleet at Vladivostok to be deficient. Vladivostok was ice
bound in winter and somewhat isolated by straits controlled
by Japan. Intent on improving their access to the Pacific,
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Russia leased Port Arthur, on the Yellow Sea, from China.
China had only recently obtained the city during a war with
Japan. Russian occupation of a city so recently held by
Japan set the two nations on a course for war.
[Ref. 17: p. 40]
During the years preceding the Russo-Japanese War the
Russian Navy had built what appeared to be a formidable
fleet. This fleet would prove to be a paper tiger as
important advances in technology (including radio
communications) were neglected, and training and shore
facilities were overlooked. These factors, along with the
superior personnel and tactics of the Japanese, would result
in a final and complete defeat of the Tsarist Navy. [Ref. 12:
pp. 197-203]
At the outbreak of war Russia had a numerical, although
not qualitative, advantage over the Japanese. The logistical
and tactical disadvantage of the Russian fleet was made worse
by the fact that their numerical advantage over the Japanese
was made up of ships half a world away, in the Baltic. The
Japanese fleet was strategically concentrated in the theater
and had the further advantage of superior shore support with
short supply lines. [Ref. 12: pp. 206-212]
Striking quickly in hopes of securing an early victory,
the Japanese made a surprise attack, prior to declaration of
war, on the Russian squadron at Port Arthur. Due to
defective ordinance, this attack was not completely
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Figure 3.2 The Far East, 1905
[Ref. 14: p. 337]
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successful and the Japanese blockaded both Port Arthur and
Vladivostok. Several Russian attempts to break out of their
ports were unsuccessful. With the Pacific fleet trapped in
port the Baltic Fleet set sail to relieve their countrymen.
Denied use of the Suez canal, the long transit took its toll
in morale and material condition. When the Baltic Fleet
finally arrived in the theater, it met the Imperial Japanese
Navy in the Tsushima Strait. This battle, in May of 1904,
was the Tsarist Navy's last and most humiliating defeat. The
effects of the long voyage, poor training, and overwhelming
tactical superiority of the Japanese fleet resulted in
thirty-four of thirty-seven Russian ships being lost.
[Ref. 12: pp. 264-265]
The Russo-Japanese war left the Baltic and Pacific fleets
in ruin. All that remained for the Tsarist Navy was the
aging Black Sea Fleet. The Russian Navy found itself in
sixth place world wide behind the United States, Germany and
Japan. The Tsarist Navy would never recover, attempts to
rebuild would be made, but these efforts would be overtaken
by revolution and World War. [Ref. 12: pp. 267-282]
The period between the Russo-Japanese War and World War
One was one of considerable domestic turmoil for the whole of
Russian society. As Imperial Russia slowly and laboriously
modernized during the Industrial revolution, the population
came to realize that the present Tsarist system of
government, born of a feudal agrarian society, could not
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effectively govern in the industrial age. The mass of
Russian population was shifting from the rural countryside to
the cities and more and more of the citizenry began to draw
their subsistence from a factory wage rather than from the
land. This rising proletariat found themselves overworked
and underpaid, unable to compete with the more modern, and
democratic, industrial nations of the West. From this
dissatisfied environment sprang unions and other types of
political collections of workers, the Bolsheviks included.
During the years prior to the war these organizations'
attempts to gain a political foothold in the Russian
government were unsuccessful as a majority of Russians
remained nationalistically loyal to the Tsar.
[Ref. 14: pp. 332-334]
After the humiliating defeat on both land and sea by the
Japanese, support for the Tsar plummeted and the monarchy
began to lose its iron grip on Russian society. In 1905 a
series of strikes and riots by the ever more powerful
workers' unions escalated to revolution. The Russian
military took an active part in the revolt, including the
storied mutiny of the Black Sea Fleet Battleship Potemkin .
*
* On June 27th, 1905, the crew of the Potemkin mutinied,
killing the Captain, Executive Officer, the Chaplain and four
other officers. The remaining officers escaped leaping
overboard. The exact cause of the revolt is speculative,
there are two stories. The common parts of both accounts are
that the crew was dissatisfied with the quality of rations,
and that one rating was shot by the Executive Officer. After
the revolt, the Potemkin was pursued by the Black Sea Fleet.
After evading pursuit for nine days the ship, exhausted of
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While this revolt did not bring down the Tsarist government
it did force several governmental reforms including the
election of a national non-deliberative legislative body (the
Duma) , and the recognition of the first Soviets (councils of
workers)
. [Ref . 11: pp. 261-271]
After the Russo-Japanese War the Tsarist Navy was faced
with a substantial rebuilding requirement if it was to regain
its pre-war prominence. In the atmosphere of political
unrest following the war, this reconstruction was not
accomplished. On the eve of World War One, the Russian Navy
found itself in poor material condition and beset by low
morale. [Ref. 18: pp. 160-164]
The World War would do little to improve this situation.
In the Baltic, although numerically superior to the German
Fleet (most German assets were devoted to the North Sea) , the
Russian Fleet was subordinated to the Army, and relegated to
fighting a mine warfare champaign in defense of Petrograd
(during the war the germanic name of St. Petersburg was
replaced with the former) . The Russian capital ships rarely
ventured out of port. [Ref. 18: pp. 166-172]
The situation in the Black Sea was little better. Here
the Russians were fighting their old enemies the Turks once
again. The Dardanelles were closed early in the war by
German and Turkish attacks, and only through a major land
coal and water, was scuttled. She would be raised however
and participate in World War One.
[Ref. 18: pp. 156-159]
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campaign could they be reopened. There were several allied
attempts at forcing the straits, but French and British
support (occupied with more pressing concerns in Europe) was
sporadic. Without consistent Anglo-French assistance the
straits remained blocked for the balance of the war and the
Russian Fleet was contained in the Black Sea. [Ref. 18: pp.
173-178]
World War One marked the last employment of the Tsarist
Navy. A navy of glorious success (the Battle of Tchesme) and
miserable failure (the Battle of Tsushima Strait) , the
Imperial Navy had suffered mainly from starvation of
attention of the Russian Monarchy. With the (glaring)
exception of Peter I, and to a lesser extent Catharine II,
the Russian Navy had been ignored by the throne. Russia's
justifiable continental bias (both the Mongols and Napoleon
had arrived by land rather than sea) had relegated the navy
to a secondary position behind the army. In such a deprived
environment a navy of Western quality did not evolve.
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IV. THE SOVIET NAVY
The fall of the Russian Monarchy and the birth of The
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1917 was a changing of
the guard which had its genesis during World War One.
Domestic conditions in pre-War Russia had changed little from
those before the Russo-Japanese War in spite of the 1905
revolution and its reforms. At the dawn of the World War,
Imperial Russia was a political disaster in waiting, a
government teetering on the brink of collapse. The political
and economic impact of the war would provide the impetus to
bring the whole structure crashing down.
Imperial Russia was ill-prepared to participate in a war
of the scope and technology required by World War One. She
lacked the industrial capacity to equip and maintain a large
army. As the political climate became increasingly more
radical, what troops Russia did have under arms became
decreasingly loyal to the Tsar (and their own officers)
.
Nonetheless the country mobilized over fifteen-million men.
During the course of the war this army would suffer a
combination of over seven-million casualties and prisoners.
This large exodus of eligible workers to the front further
reduced an already weak industrial and agricultural capacity.
Strikes increased in number and violence. The situation came
to a head in March of 1917 when Tsar Nicholas II (the last of
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the Romanovs) was forced to abdicate, leaving the throne to
his brother Michael. Realizing that the title was a losing
proposition, Michael himself would abdicate in favor of a
Provisional Government after a reign of only one day. [Ref.
13: pp. 453-455]
This Provisional Government was established in the
capital of Petrograd, and was guickly recognized by the
United States along with other Western democracies. The new
government, a darling of democracy, was beset from the start
by a formidable rival for control of the country. This rival
was the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies which had been
established at the same time as the Provisional Government.
The Petrograd Soviet represented the citizens, workers and
(although the country was engaged in a World War) soldiers.
Initially the Petrograd Soviet was controlled by the Social
Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. These factions were more
moderate than the third socialistic faction, the Bolsheviks.
Because of the moderate nature of the Soviet, an overt power
struggle with the Provisional Government was delayed. The
Petrograd Soviet did issue the famous Order No. 1, which
provided for elected political committees to run military
units. This Order was followed closely by the issuance of
Order No. 2 which placed all arms in the control of the
committees (vice the officers) and abolished saluting and
other military discipline, including removing authority from
off duty officers. These reforms did much to endear the
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military (exclusive of the officers who were a small
minority) to the Soviet. Occurring as they did during the
war, these reforms further degraded the efficiency of the
military and increased domestic strife.* [Ref. 14: 556-566]
In April of 1917 Vladimir Ilich Lenin returned to Russia
from exile in Switzerland and began directing the Bolsheviks
in their methodical usurping of the Provisional Government's
power. In July a premature attempt at seizing complete power
failed and Lenin fled to Finland, although he continued to
direct the Bolsheviks. In mid-September the Bolsheviks
gained majority control of the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets
and Lenin returned to Petrograd. Lenin's return was to have
lasting consequence. On November 7th and 8th (in concert
with the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison, sailors from
Kronstadt, and the Worker's Red Guards) the Bolsheviks
stormed the Winter Palace and overthrew the Provisional
Government. [Ref. 13: pp. 458-461]
Naval participation in the Revolution was not limited to
the sailors from Kronstadt, although these sailors were some
of the most militant elements of the Bolshevik manpower base.
The signal to begin the assault was the gunfire (although
blank rounds) directed at the Winter Palace by the Baltic
cruiser Aurora. The sailors from Kronstadt and from the
* The Petrograd Soviet also issued the Bill of Soldiers
Rights, declaring that all soldiers were entitled to certain
civil rights. These rights included political and religious
freedom, freedom of expression, and abolition of corporal
punishment at the front and throughout the country.
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Baltic Fleet would prove loyal to the Revolution through the
ensuing consolidation of power by the Bolsheviks. In
December the Commander of the Baltic Fleet was replaced by a
former sailor and in January of 1918 the Imperial Navy was
officially abolished. In place of the defunct Tsarist Navy
would rise the Red Navy. [Ref. 12: 330-331, Ref. 18: p. 187]
Imperial Russia had fallen as a result of her inability
to participate in World War One. The Bolsheviks would not
make the same mistake. With the alternatives of continuing
the war and risking governmental collapse, or peace and
governmental stability, the young administration chose peace.
In April a Soviet-German peace treaty was signed. This
treaty was not without price however, for the Germans
recognized the Soviets precarious position. As a result of
the treaty the young government was forced to cede twenty-
seven percent of her arable lands and some sixty million
people to puppet states (Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania)
controlled by Germany. [Ref. 13: pp. 476-478]
The premature departure from the war by Communist Russia
aggravated the Allies (Great Britain, France, and the U.S.),
for the peace removed the pressure on the Central Powers
caused by the Eastern front. The Allies refused to recognize
the Soviet-German pact and were intent on continuing the war
in the East with or without Soviet help. There were also
large amounts of Allied war supplies in the Russian ports of
Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, and Vladivostok. The Allies did not
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Figure 4.1 Revolution and Civil War in Russia
[Ref. 13: p. 481]
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want these supplies to fall into Bolshevik or German hands.
This interest in the affairs of the new government would
result in Allied intervention in favor of the counter-
revolutionary forces (the Whites) during the ensuing Russian
Civil War. [Ref. 11: pp. 305-306]
Although the White movement existed prior to the Allied
intervention it was this intervention in the summer of 1918
which resulted in outbreak of the Russian civil war. The
intervention involved fourteen countries including the U.S.,
Japan, Great Britain, and France. During the early part of
the war the Whites enjoyed some military success, threatening
the Red strongholds of Petrograd and Moscow. Largely because
of the strong leadership of the Red Minister of War, Leon
Trotsky, the Soviets were able to defeat the Whites in spite
of the Allied intervention. This intervention gradually
declined and effectively ended by late 1920. Power
consolidation continued and by late 1922 the capital had been
relocated in Moscow and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (U.S.S.R.) officially came into being.
[Ref. 13: pp. 483-487]
The level of Red Navy activity varied from theater to
theater during the Civil War. At the outbreak of the war the
Baltic region contained the strongest Red fleet.
Unfortunately it was also the region where the strongest
interventionist naval opposition was to take place. A force
of British cruisers and destroyers sailed into the Baltic and
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contained the Red fleet forcing the Bolshevik naval force to
cower in their ports on the Gulf of Finland. Clear evidence
that navies do not in and of themselves win wars, the British
naval success had little effect on the outcome of the war on
land as the Red armies defeated those of the Whites in that
region. [Ref. 12: pp 335-340] Perhaps one reason for the
Reds' continental success and maritime failure was the use of
Red sailors as Naval Infantry to augment the Army [Ref. 4:
pp. 127-128]. In the remaining fleet areas (the Far East,
Black, and Arctic) the Reds had very limited naval forces
relative to the Whites. Nonetheless successes on land
carried the day as the White Armies were systematically
defeated. [Ref. 12: pp. 342-354]
The tumultuous period from 1914 to the end of the Civil
War in 1920 made any progress in the area of naval
development impossible. With the Tsarist government
overthrown and the Navy racked by mutiny, many officers fled
into exile or were killed outright. To make matters worse
there would be one last disaster to befall the naval
establishment; the Kronstadt Naval Revolt. In March of 1921
the sailors of the Kronstadt Naval Garrison, sailors who had
been so fanatically loyal to the revolution, revolted again,
this time against their former leaders the Bolsheviks. With
the Civil War over the sailors demanded reforms, not unlike
those established in the Bill of Soldiers Rights of 1917.
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Intolerant of such dissent the Bolsheviks ruthlessly crushed
the uprising with great loss of life on both sides.
[Ref. 18: pp. 197-200]
There were two naval lessons learned by the Bolsheviks
during the Revolution and Civil War. First, lacking naval
superiority, the Reds had been blockaded by the Allies. This
blockade made resupply of the Red Army difficult while the
White forces had free maritime resupply. The lack of open
Sea Lines of Communication caused much hardship in Soviet
Russia. In spite of this naval imbalance, a strong and
efficient army was able to secure victory. The lesson for
the Bolsheviks was that a strong navy certainly made ones
life easier but in a predominantly continental champaign, the
army was most important to victory. The second lesson
learned concerned the political reliability of the Navy. The
sailors of Kronstadt had revolted not only against the Tsar
and the Provisional Government, but also against the
Bolsheviks. Clearly the Navy was an organ over which close
scrutiny and control must be exercised.
[Ref. 12: pp. 355-356]
During the decade following the Civil War the new Soviet
Government became somewhat isolationist, turning its
resources inward as it attempted to rebuild the shattered
economy. The difficult industrial task of rebuilding the
Navy would take a back seat to this domestic reconstruction
and it would not be until the inauguration of the first Five
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Year Plan (1929) that serious attempts at naval
reconstruction could begin. The isolationist years were not
entirely dormant in the area of naval affairs as many "paper
improvements" were made. These advances included
organization of more naval schools (albeit communist ones)
,
and a technical information exchange program with the German
government. [Ref. 12: pp. 358-362]
The 1929 decision to begin rebuilding the fleets also
began a debate centered about the exact type of navy the
nation would build. This debate between proponents of a sea-
control navy (Traditionalist) and a sea-denial navy
(Modernist) continues to this day in the Soviet naval
establishment. The discussion in the early years was driven
not so much by innovative strategic thought but by economic
necessity. The Traditionalist, or Old School argument
proposed a Mahanian navy consisting of a balanced force of
battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, a force not unlike the
stronger navies of the era (Japan, Great Britain, U.S.). Most
proponents of the Old School were former Tsarist officers.
The Traditional navy was also expensive to build and
maintain. On the other hand the Modernist, or New School
argument proposed a "guerrilla" navy of submarines, small
fast surface craft, and naval aircraft. The New School
proponents were the younger officers, schooled in Marxism-
Leninism, who were rising to positions of influence in the
Soviet Navy. The strongest selling point of the Modern navy
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was the fact that it did not require large industrial
resources to build, and once built was relatively inexpensive
to maintain. Because of the weak Russian economy and lack of
industrial capability the Modernist argument won out and
construction began, continuing into the thirties.
[Ref. 19: pp. 19-21]
By 1937 the Soviet industrial capacity had recovered to
the point that construction of a more Traditional fleet could
be considered. Joseph Stalin (who after Lenin's death in
1924 had become the General Secretary of the Communist Party)
had never really embraced the Modernist approach and the
notion that the Soviet industry could only build the
inexpensive Modernist fleet was, by implication, a criticism
of Stalin himself. The growing German threat, the ability to
"do better", and Stalin's desire for the status obtained by a
larger fleet, factors which in combination resulted in the
naval construction program taking a more Traditional course
after 1937. [Ref. 12: pp. 365-372]
Concurrently, though not necessarily linked with the
revised construction program, Stalin began the infamous
purges of the nation's military officers. Regardless of any
association, the purges served to silence any dissent to
Stalin's new naval policy. The Soviet Navy lost many top
officers to the purges, including the Commander-in-Chief and
the commanders of all of the fleets save the Pacific.
[Ref. 12: p. 373]
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On the eve of World War Two the Soviet Navy was in a
similar position as that of the Tsarist Navy on the eve of
the Russo-Japanese War. The material condition of the fleet
was better than in 1905, but the new construction program had
been in existence for only five short years. The fleet
remained essentially a Modernist one. The real similarity
was the level of experience and morale of the officer corps.
The purges had eliminated most of the experienced senior
naval leadership, and those officers who survived the purges
were uncertain of their positions. Another purge could begin
at any time, so the officers trusted no one. World War Two
was the first real test of the new Red Navy. Although
slightly better prepared than their Tsarist ancestors had
been in 1905 and 1914, the result of the naval conflict would
be no different. [Ref. 18: 207-208]
As the Japanese had surprised the Russians at Port Arthur
in 1914 and the Germans had surprised the Russians in Eastern
Europe in 1914, so was Stalin surprised when Hitler launched
"Operation Barbarossa" , the attack on the Soviet Union in
1941. Prior to the offensive, the German Navy had covertly
laid minefields across possible Soviet naval access to the
Baltic and Black Seas. When the offensive began, the German
Army swept quickly along the Southern coast of the Baltic and
the Gulf of Finland. The Soviet Fleet attempted to leave its
ports but suffered greatly at the hands of the preemptively
laid German minefields. The advancing Germans quickly
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Figure 4.2 Russia in World War Two
[Ref. 13: p. 519]
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overran most of the Soviet Naval bases and the remaining Red
ships were forced to retire to Leningrad and Kronstadt. With
Leningrad besieged, the naval war in the Baltic became a
stalemate of mine warfare attrition. The Soviet Army, with
some assistance from the idle naval forces [Ref. 6: pp. 20-
21], was able to defend Leningrad successfully until the tide
of the war turned in 1944 and ultimately chased the invaders
back into Germany. [Ref. 18: pp. 209-212,221]
In the Black Sea the Soviets fared little better. Due to
planning difficulties the Wehrmacht was slow in mounting an
offensive, and the Soviets were able to sortie with
considerably less damage than in the Baltic. The German
strategy in the Black Sea was the same as in the Baltic; to
deny the Soviets their naval bases and hence render the
Soviet Navy useless. The German Army moved into the Crimea
and laid siege to Sevastopol. The siege of Sevastopol,
unlike Leningrad, was a German success. Again, like
Leningrad, the Soviet Navy and naval personnel played a role
in the land defense of the city. The loss of Sevastopol
forced the Soviets to conduct their naval operations (mostly
amphibious in nature and in support of the Soviet Army) over
extended distances from the only Black Sea ports they had
remaining (on the eastern coast) . The German advance
continued East, capturing Novorossisk, but stalled before the
remaining Black Sea ports could be taken. In 1943,
overextended along the Eastern front, the Germans began to be
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forced back and by 194 4 Sevastopol was back in Soviet hands.
The loss of West coast Black Sea bases and subordination to
Army command made the Black Sea Fleet, although numerically
superior to the Axis naval forces, ineffective by Western
naval standards. The Soviet Army defeated the Germans in
this theater as they had in the Baltic, and the Soviet Navy
apparently had little to do with the success. [Ref. 12: pp.
404-419]
The Soviet Navy also operated in the Arctic and Pacific
Oceans, though their contribution in these theaters is hardly
noteworthy. In the Arctic, with a good deal of Allied naval
assistance, the flow of war supplies to Murmansk was never
really threatened. Operations against Japan consisted of a
successful amphibious assault of the Kuril Islands. The
Soviet Union's war lasted only one week in 1945, and was
against an opponent who was already virtually defeated.
[Ref. 18: pp. 213-214,225]
The Soviet Navy in World War Two had proven to be
embarrassingly ineffective in the Black and Baltic Seas, an
afterthought in the Pacific, and a minor part of a larger
Allied effort in the Arctic. The Soviet Army, on the other
hand, had defeated the invading German Army. The role played
by the Soviet Navy in this successful defense of the
motherland was, at the very best, supportive only.
[Ref. 12: pp. 453-455,468]
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Following World War Two the evolution of the Soviet Navy
continued, however, further discussion becomes clouded by the
many closed-source documents on the more recent developments.
Post-war developments are also generally well known to the
Western analyst (though they may not be completely
understood)
. The developments of the latter half of this
century are more contemporary than they are historical. This
contemporary nature and the desire to avoid accidental
reference to classified information, lead the author to keep
comments on this period of Soviet naval history brief.
Post-war developments continued along the course set in
1937 as Stalin attempted to build a more balanced fleet. The
goal of a more balanced fleet was driven mainly by the desire
to counter the threat poised by the U.S. and British fleets.
All post-war development would be invariably linked to
Western developments. The construction of a balanced fleet
would continue until Stalin's death in 1953. Stalin's
successor as General Secretary was Nikita Kruschev. Kruschev
was to have two major impacts on the character of the Soviet
Navy. First he would denounce Stalin's plan for a balanced
fleet, scrapping the construction program, and he would
appoint Admiral Sergei Gorshkov to command the Navy. In
place of Stalin's fleet, Kruschev began a fleet emphasising
submarines and nuclear weapons. The second "innovation,"
Admiral Gorshkov, would serve well into the 1980 's. After
the highly embarrassing Cuban Missile Crisis, Gorshkov was
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able to change Kruschev's mind about the submarine fleet
emphasis and return to a more balanced program. Nonetheless,
the submarine remains the centerpiece of the modern Soviet
fleet. [Ref. 20: pp. 90-94]
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V. CONCLUSIONS
There are several inferences about the Soviet Navy, and
the position it occupies in the Soviet Military, that can be
drawn from the study of the Russian and Soviet naval
development. These conclusions are important when attempting
to place the Soviet Navy in the proper context, that is a
Soviet context rather than that of a Westerner. The Soviet
military's view of a navy is primarily one of subordination
to and support of an army.
. .
.
the participation of a navy is most effective within
the framework of a single overall operation in a
continental theater of military operations where ground
forces should play the main role....
[Ref 21: p. 23]
A major historical fact of Russian and Soviet naval
development has been the Navy's consistent failure when
attempting to conduct out of area, sea-control or other blue-
water operations. There have been few successes in this
venue. Of note are the defeat of the Swedes by both Peter I
and Catharine II, the Mediterranean deployment and defeat of
the Turks (also during Catharine II's reign), and the
successes of the Napoleonic era. But lest one place undue
emphasis on these successes, they all came against either
inferior foes or with the aid of a strong naval ally. From
the stumbling attempts to build a fleet prior to Peter I, to
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the failure of Peter I to defeat the Turks and gain access to
the Black Sea, to the humiliating defeats of the Crimean and
Russo-Japanese Wars, to the containment in World Wars One and
Two and the Civil War, and finally to the political
embarrassment of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the list of Soviet
blue-water failures is lengthy.
The Soviet Navy's blue-water failures are often
independent of head of state interest, material condition of
the fleets, training levels of the personnel, and opposing
fleet strength. This pattern of failure leads the author to
postulate that there exists in the Soviet military
establishment, a perception that the Soviet Navy will most
likely fail in any future blue-water endeavors. In a closed
society such as the Soviet Union it is difficult to find
definitive support for this view. Such an open admission of
a lack of confidence in the Soviet Navy's ability to conduct
blue-water operations would be a criticism of the Navy
itself. Those familiar with Soviet society will know that
such a criticism (if it existed) would not be made available
in open source literature. The author realizes that
historical fact alone is not enough to support his views.
Perhaps tacit endorsement of this view may be found in the
de-emphasis of blue-water operations in Soviet discussions of
naval art.
Thus the traditional operations of fleet against fleet
which, since ancient times, have been characteristics of
the struggle against sea communications of the opposing
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sides, are now being used in a new, decisive sphere
—
operations of fleet against shore. [Ref. 4: p. 222]
The Russian and Soviet Navies have conducted a limited
number of blue-water operations. The reason there have been
few attempts at blue-water operations is not based on the
failures, rather a geographical fact. Historically, the
political and expansionist interests of Russia and the Soviet
Union have been in the European and Asian land masses. There
has been a corresponding lack of interest in North and South
America. To further their aims on the continent, Russia and
The Soviet Union would need a strong army but would have
little need for a blue-water navy. Even objectives in Africa
could be obtained with out a strong blue-water navy. This
geographical fact leads the author to form a second opinion
as to the perceived position of the Navy within the Soviet
Union, that of a strong ground force bias.
While the ground force bias may be caused by geopolitical
reasons, some of the supporting evidence of its existence is
based on historical fact. Attacked by the Mongols in the
thirteenth century, a strong army could have saved the
country, a strong navy would have been next to useless. When
Russia was invaded by Napoleon in 1812, and by the Germans in
World War One and again in World War Two, the country was
saved and the invaders repelled by the army. The navy's
contribution was supporting at best. In World War Two and
the Civil War the Soviet Army was able to succeed against a
formidable foe in spite of Soviet naval inferiority.
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Vice Admiral K. Stalbo, writing in Mosrkov Sbornik in
1981 supports the view that navies cannot win wars alone. He
argues that navies can only influence the course of a war
[Ref. 22: pp. 20-28]. A strong navy may make the war on land
go smoother, but certainly a strong navy is not mandatory to
achieve victory. While this may not always be the case, it
has been in all of the major conflicts involving Russia and
the Soviet Union.
The continental bias is further supported by the
historical fact of using Russian and Soviet naval personnel
and equipment to bolster the land defenses. In the Crimean
War Russian warships were sunk in Sevastopol harbor, their
cannon and sailors were removed for defense of the city.
Conditions were similar in the Baltic during World War One,
the Civil War, and the Black and Baltic theaters of World War
Two. These historical facts lead the author to the opinion
that the perception in the Soviet Military is that the best
use of a navy is to give the sailors rifles and put them in
the trenches.
A topical example of the continental bias in the Soviet
Military is the fact that all the current High Commanders of
Forces for the Soviet Theaters of Strategic Military Action
are Army Marshals or Generals [Ref. 23: p. 208], as are the
present and past commanders of the sixteen Military Districts
(Soviet Military Districts are roughly equivalent to a U.S.
Joint Command) [Ref. 15: pp. 187-213].
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The geographical constraints of the Eurasian land mass
have led to the preeminance of the Army in Russian and Soviet
military operations and the corresponding lack of interest in
blue-water naval operations. Coastal naval operations are
another matter. Based on the historical fact of Russian and
Soviet naval success in brown-water operations, it is the
opinion of the author that even in the Army dominated Soviet
military, there is a belief that a navy could be of use in a
supporting coastal role. From the liberation of Kiev by
Rurik (although some would dispute this being a "Russian".
operation) , continuing to the Kievan attacks on Byzantium,
the initial success of Peter I at Azov, and the few successes
of the Civil and World Wars, most Russian and Soviet naval
accomplishment have been in this area of warfare.
The experience of World War II and subsequent local wars
has shown that . . . the main naval mission of naval forces
will be to deliver reinforcements and provisions by means
of sea shipments. ... [Ref. 21: p. 26]
As stated in the introduction to this work, the author
does not propose that theses of this nature replace the
technological analysis of systems. However, historical
research in the field of Command and Control to complement
technological studies should be continued. This thesis has
presented a broad look at Russian and Soviet naval history.
This broad scope can be narrowed and the different periods of
development explored in depth.
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Particularly germane to the study and understanding of
the force control of the modern Soviet Navy would be an
examination of the operations of the Second World War.
Inasmuch as many current U.S. naval tactics and control
systems had their genesis in World War Two, the author
suggests that perhaps so did current Soviet naval tactics and
systems. Admiral V. Ponikarovskiv postulates that naval
force control is at least navy specific.
There is no doubt that Navy control theory, as an integral
part of Armed Forces control theory, should reflect Navy
specifics in the performance of missions peculiar to the
Navy. [Ref. 24: p. 19]
Conceivably the Soviet system of Naval Force Control is
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